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DLD-263        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1463 
___________ 
 
RASHEEN NIFAS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRIAN V. COLEMAN; M. ZAKEN; 
T. BERRIER; W. LEGGETT; 
E. MANCHAS; R. CLARK; 
S. RYMAROWICZ; D. HOOPER; 
C. ABEREGG; V. KNIZNER; 
CO.1 BARKLEY; CO.1 CASTELLO; 
CO.1 A.W. EICHER; CO.1 A. ROLL; 
CO.1 STROUTMAN; CO.1 R.F. COLLINS; 
K. CROSS; P. YETTER;  
T. CESARINO-MARTIN; R. PETRUS; 
J. MONAS; M. VARNER; 
I. DICIO; D. VARNER; 
T. WILLIAMS; R. MACINTYRE; 
T. MARK 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-01486) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 31, 2013 
 
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 13, 2013) 
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_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Rasheen Nifas, a Pennsylvania inmate proceeding pro so, filed a complaint in the 
District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights by numerous corrections employees.  The District Court granted 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim in part, preserving 
only the Eighth Amendment claims.
1
  The remaining defendants thereafter moved for summary 
judgment on those claims, which the District Court granted.  Nifas timely filed this appeal.  For 
the following reasons, we will affirm. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s March 5, 2012 order granting in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.  See Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010).  Dismissal is 
appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) “only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in 
the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, . . . [the] 
plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).  We also 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s February 12, 2012 order granting summary 
judgment to the defendants, using the same standard as the District Court.  See Pichler v. 
                                              
1
 Nifas filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s March 5, 2012 order dismissing 
several defendants and claims.  See C.A. No. 12-1705.  That appeal was later dismissed for 
failure to prosecute.  See Fed. R. App. P. 3(a); L.A.R. 3.3 and Misc. 107.1(a).   
 3 
 
UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008).  Summary judgment is appropriate if the record 
reveals “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
We agree with the District Court that Nifas’s complaint failed to state claims for 
retaliation.  Although he sufficiently alleged that he was engaged in conduct protected by the 
First Amendment when he filed grievances and lawsuits against prison officials, see Smith v. 
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002), and in some instances sufficiently alleged that 
adverse action was taken against him, the complaint failed to demonstrate a causal connection 
between the exercise of his constitutional rights and any adverse action.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000).
2
  Our review of the complaint also convinces 
us that the District Court properly determined that Nifas failed to state a claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause with respect to the prison’s disciplinary 
proceedings.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995).  
We also agree with the District Court that the defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment on Nifas’s various Eighth Amendment claims.  Nifas claimed that SCI-Fayette 
corrections officers violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they (1) failed to protect him 
from threats of violence and ongoing sexual harassment; (2) failed to take reasonable measures 
to protect his safety when fellow inmate Rodriguez attempted to spray cleaning solvent in his 
eyes; (3) used excessive force in the course of subduing him during the ensuing physical 
                                              
2
 The District Court also properly noted that some of Nifas’s retaliation claims were subject to 
dismissal as unexhausted.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). 
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altercation with inmate Rodriguez; (4) failed to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force; 
and (5) failed to provide him with adequate medical treatment. 
The defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Nifas’s failure to protect claims.  
The Eighth Amendment imposes a general duty on prison officials to protect inmates from 
violence by other prisoners.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).  In order to 
succeed on a failure to protect claim under § 1983, an inmate must demonstrate that corrections 
officers acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.  See Beers-
Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).  The undisputed facts here do not show 
that Nifas was exposed to a risk of serious harm with respect to the incident involving inmate 
Rodriguez or the alleged threats and sexual harassment he received from other inmates.  See 
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).  Nifas also failed to 
establish that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference, which requires showing that 
they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
837.    
The defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Nifas’s excessive force and 
failure to intervene claims.  In reviewing excessive force claims in the context of the Eighth 
Amendment, we look to whether “force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or 
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 
U.S. 1, 14 (1992).  In conducting that inquiry, we examine the need for the application of 
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, the extent of injury 
inflicted, the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, and any efforts to temper the 
severity of a forceful response.  See Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000).  Here, 
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Nifas alleged that Rodriguez sprayed cleaning solvent in his eyes and officers responded by 
ramming Nifas’s head into a steel doorway and forcefully jumping on his back and shoulder.  
A video recording of the incident, however, shows that Nifas was the initial aggressor in the 
altercation with Rodriguez and that corrections officers responded with an objectively 
reasonable amount of force in order to subdue him and restore discipline.
3
   Because we find 
that no constitutional violation occurred with respect to excessive force, Nifas also cannot 
succeed on his failure to intervene claims.  See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
Finally, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Nifas’s medical treatment 
claims.  In order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate 
medication treatment, an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials were deliberately 
indifferent to his serious medical needs.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).  
Here, the record reflects that Nifas received prompt medical treatment for minor injuries, 
which included scrapes and cuts, resulting from the officers’ unplanned use of force following 
the incident with Rodriguez.  The undisputed facts do not demonstrate a constitutional 
violation with respect to either deliberate indifference or a serious medical need.  See Brooks 
v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000). 
                                              
3
 Nifas has filed a motion in this Court “for leave to file declaration from a witness and two 
exhausted grievances in support of appeal,” contending that the video recording of the incident 
with Rodriguez had been “altered and important evidence was deleted.”  He maintains that the 
District Court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim because a material factual 
dispute exists with respect to whether he or Rodriguez started the altercation and the types of 
force subsequently employed by corrections officers.  The motion is denied, as Nifas never 
presented such evidence of video tampering to the District Court.  See Theriot v. Parish of 
Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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 Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.  
